

Canada's position on political developments in Tibet 1944-1969 (a study of Canadian documents).

Mntsser Hasan Dherib

Department of History, College of Education for Human Sciences, Al-Muthanna University, Iraq.

Email: mintsr@mu.edu.iq.

Abstract:

The Tibetan issue constituted an important point in the course of the Cold War between the Eastern and Western camps, as it formed an element of pressure on the Chinese government internally and externally. The Canadian government's position came from among the positions of countries interested in the Tibetan issue and opposed to - as they put it - the Chinese violations of the Tibetan people and their privacy. The Canadian documents tried to follow the Tibetan issue from its very beginnings in order to be able to form a vision about that issue, and the Canadian documents dealt with the Tibetan problem from 1944 until the discussions of the United Nations General Assembly in 1969.

These documents touched on the official position of the Canadian government after it followed this issue historically and politically, and was informed of the positions of regional and major countries on it.

The research was divided into an introduction, four sections, and a conclusion. These sections discussed Canada's political position on the Tibetan issue, and its political position focused on opposing the Chinese occupation of Tibet and the measures that resulted from it.

key words: Canadian Documents, Dalai Lama, Tibet, India, UN General Assembly.

Introduction:

The Tibetan issue constituted an important point in the course of the Cold War between the Eastern and Western camps. It was an element of pressure on the Chinese government internally and externally. At home, new rules were imposed on it to deal with its special situation. It is linked to the Chinese government and a historical dispute that has long roots, as it is different from it in terms of ethnicity, Religion, affiliation, political presence, and geographical distance. It also did not owe allegiance to any Chinese government before the communist government that took power in 1949. It also formed an element of international pressure, and this pressure was exploited by some countries to condemn the Chinese communist regime for violating the rights of the Tibetan people, so the Tibetan issue disturbed the Chinese regime. For many years until they imposed comprehensive control in 1959.1

The position of the Canadian government came from among the positions of countries concerned with the Tibetan issue and opposed to - as they put it - the Chinese violations of the Tibetan people and their privacy. The Canadian documents tried to follow the Tibetan issue from its very beginnings so that it could form a vision about that issue. It was keen to study the two situations (historical and realistic). For the Tibetan issue to determine the validity of the claims of either side of the issue, it also studied its historical, geographical, political situation and popular desire, then came up with a set of results on which it based its position.2

The Canadian documents addressed the Tibetan problem from 1944 until the discussions of the United Nations General Assembly in 1969, but what is criticized for these documents is their lack of comprehensiveness, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was often content with seeking the opinions of other countries such as India and Britain and formulating its position according to those trends. It did not care about it as an important issue affecting the Canadian presence, but rather justified it with one of the documents that we referred to in the body of the research, saying that it is "a region far from Canada and not of importance to it." However, despite that, these documents were able to present an important picture of the Tibetan issue, whether in The historical or geographical aspect, or in their documentation of Chinese violations, or in the discussions of the United Nations General Assembly, or even in Canada's

final position on that issue, so the Canadian documents deserved to be a subject of study to show the general position on the Tibetan issue and to state China's position and its claims to Tibet.³

The research was divided into an introduction, four sections, and a conclusion. The introduction included the general structure of the research and the method of its construction. As for the sections, they were based entirely on the information contained in the Canadian documents. The first section touched on the geography of Tibet and its geopolitical importance. The documents were keen to explain the geographical and economic situation of this region because that shows The extent of China's interest in it. The documents also addressed the demographic and religious status and privacy of the Tibetans over other Chinese. As for the second topic, it dealt with the historical situation of the Tibetan issue, as the Canadian documents followed the documents related to Tibet that are available to all parties to the issue, and tried to determine its position in light of the data of those documents. As for the third section, it touched on the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 and the legal position of that occupation. Then it referred to the role of the United Nations and its major powers, and showed the state of negativity in dealing with the Tibetan issue. As for the fourth section, it touched on the political developments in⁴ Tibet since the second Chinese occupation in 1959, and discussed The documents document the Tibetan position (popular and governmental) on that occupation, and the legal position on it, as well as the discussions of the Tibetan issue in the United Nations General Assembly, the efforts made by some members to condemn China, Canada's efforts to condemn China and accuse it of committing humanitarian violations against the Tibetan people, and its position on the resettlement of refugees. Tibetans.

The conclusion pointed to the most important cognitive results of the research.

The research used the methodology of the British Documentary School, with some analyzes provided by the researcher regarding some cases that were not addressed or overlooked by the documents.⁵

In conclusion, we ask God that we have presented a practical work that serves the academic library in general, and studies interested in the Chinese situation in particular.

The first topic: The geographical location of Tibet and its geopolitical importance in Canadian documents.

The Canadian government tried, through its documents, to document the demarcation of Tibet's political borders with its neighboring regions - especially through the documents it obtained - because of the importance of this in the process of matching them with the Chinese claims of ownership, and the Tibetan government's claims of independence from China, and since the issue of border demarcation is one The basic components of the state's existence. Canada was keen to know these borders and match them with the maps it had, which it obtained from friendly countries such as the British and Tibetan governments, which we will mention in the following pages of the research.⁶

According to Canadian documents, Tibet is bordered to the north by Xinjiang, to the northeast by Shanghai, to the east by Sikang, to the west by Kashmir, and to the south by India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkam. Tibet consists of a group of high plateaus bordered to the north by the Kuan Lun and Altyn Tagh mountains, and to the south by the Himalayas. Its area is about 470,000 square miles. Tibet is geographically divided into two regions:⁷

A - The first region: It is the northern plateau (Chang Tang), which extends from longitude 80 to 92 degrees east, and has an altitude of 16 thousand feet.

B - The second region: It is the valley region of the Tsang Po River and its tributaries, as the Yangtze River and many other rivers cross the provinces of Shanghai and Sikang and from there into deep valleys.⁸

As for the rain, it is light on the northern plateau, amounting to 3 inches. The temperature in July is about 40 Fahrenheit, and rises at noon to 70 Fahrenheit, while in the winter it drops to minus 40 Fahrenheit. As for Lhasa (the capital of the Tibet region) The climate is different from other

Tibetan regions. Rainfall is 10-20 inches greater, and winters are less harsh, as the temperature in July reaches 62 degrees Fahrenheit, and 27 degrees Fahrenheit in January.⁹

Tibet is connected by a number of rugged roads with its neighbors, such as Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, India, and Sikkam. These roads are mostly traversed by walking, and animals are used to transport goods with some of these regions. As for the communication routes with China, they are very rugged and require

passage through passes with a height of more than 15,000 feet. As for the communication routes with Mongolia and Sinkiang, they are via (Hsi Ning), which passes through the capital of Shanghai province (Tsinghai), and is not connected to northern Tibet by any direct road.¹⁰

The population of Tibet is estimated at approximately 1.2-2 million people. If the provinces of Qinghai and Sikang are included in it - according to Tibetan claims - this will increase the population by two million people. Most of these people are concentrated in the Cang Po River basin and speak the Tibetan language. The population is estimated at Lhasa has about 50 thousand people, while the majority are nomads spread throughout most of the regions of Tibet and neighboring countries. As of 1950, there were four foreigners in Tibet, including two Britons who work as radio station operators and other Australians (the document did not specify their work).¹¹

As for the Tibetan economy, it is an agricultural pastoralist economy, as geographical isolation has enhanced the self-sufficiency of Tibetans. Animal products are the most important economic resources for the region, as they provide them with butter and wool. The population uses yak dung as fuel for heating and cooking, and musk and deer antlers are also used as an important source of the economy. As for grains, they are grown in river valleys, and the most important grain products are barley and buckwheat. No important mineral sources were discovered there, but later other resources were discovered by the Chinese authorities in Chenghai and Sikang, namely silver, iron, sulfur, and coal, and oil was discovered in undeclared quantities.^{12,15}

India works as a trade intermediary with Tibet, as the latter exports wool, yak tails, musk, and hides in exchange for cotton products, tobacco, and rice, while it exports gold dust and wool to China.

Fur, musk, and deer antlers are used for medicinal purposes, and tea, fabrics, and matches are imported.¹⁶

As for authority in Tibet, it is a theocratic authority in which the powers (religious, legislative, and executive) are held in the hands of the Dalai Lama, who is believed to be the incarnation of Buddha. The Dalai controls the powers granted to the monasteries surrounding his areas of influence, and officials are chosen from the secular nobility and from the monks of the temples. The Dalai has a political council called the Council. The Grand Assembly consists of four people, three of whom are common nobles and one monk, and its mission is to discuss with the Dalai Lama and express an opinion on public matters. There is also a National Assembly, which includes secular nobles and monks and is responsible for choosing a guardian for the Dalai Lama. As for the Panchen Lama, he holds great spiritual authority as the Dalai Lama's teacher, but his temporal authority is limited and is often limited to his own temple known as Kumbum Temple, which is now located in Shanghai and is under the protection of Communist China.^{17,19}

The Tibet region had varying importance among the countries of the world. It was of great importance to a neighboring country like India, due to the religious and social commonalities between the two peoples, while the American government showed less desire to intervene at the beginning of the crisis with China in 1950 due to its preoccupation with post-World War II problems. But it later intervened due to the conflict imposed by the Cold War between the Eastern and Western camps.²⁰

As for Canada, it is the allied country with America and its projects, but its interest in this region was not great. According to the Canadian government, it is one of the regions far away from it and does not have clear commonalities with it. However, despite this, the Canadian government was keen to understand the internal situation in Tibet and its internal developments, and tried to take a position. Of Chinese interference in Tibet through a collection of correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their embassy in India.²¹

The second topic: The historical and legal position of the Tibetan issue in Canadian documents.

The Canadian government believes that China has been claiming sovereignty over Tibet since 1751, and these claims are classified as nominal claims only. Tibet has maintained its independence for a long time, mainly due to the desire of the British government to keep it independent and make it a buffer state between India and Russia, but after the establishment of The Chinese Revolution and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty demanded that China annex it in 1912. The British government rejected this request, and although Britain recognized Chinese sovereignty, it refused direct intervention in Tibet as an autonomous

region. The Chinese and British parties did not reach an agreement on Tibet during the duration of the British presence in India .22,23

Before communist control, the Chinese did not attempt to force the Tibetans to join them by force. Rather, they considered this a form of aggression against Tibet. However, as the communist forces approached control over China, communist slogans and principles were penetrating most of the Tibetan regions, and the Canadian government followed the developments of the Tibetan crisis during that time. The period expressed its astonishment at the statements of some lamas from the Labrang region. In a statement by the lama (Qiang Yang) to the Central News Agency, Huang Chengqing, he indicated that they stand firmly behind the national movement - as he put it - led by the Chinese Communist Party and the war of resistance, and the latter visited the Tibet region. And the borders to preach the necessity of a war of resistance.24

The communist statements before they took power attracted the feelings of most workers, peasants, and the general public in China. The goals they called for, such as liberation, social justice, equality, and human rights, were all poetic and attracted hearts to them. In addition, the Chinese people suffered greatly as a result.25

Internal wars between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the external Japanese occupation, so the Communists succeeded in entering the hearts of many, including the Buddhist clergy.26

The Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its astonishment at the position of the Lamas towards the communist incursion into Tibet, so it asked the American ambassador to India, Mr. Henderson, for information about that incursion because he had made a visit during that period to Nepal. The Canadian Foreign Ministry admits that its mission in China does not provide sufficient information about the events. Because it relies for its information on Chinese officials who visit the region, and they are usually not interested in conveying details of the events, and the information obtained from Tibetans coming from the provinces of Shanghai and Sikang was not accurate because of their distance from the center of events in Inner Tibet.27

The information received by the Canadian High Commissioner in Delhi indicated that Tibet is not a fertile ground for the growth of communist ideas, but rather it is an area subject to the religious influences of the Dalai Lama and the religious groups associated with him, and since the region is full of uneducated herdsmen who are indifferent to progress, the issue of them accepting the status quo and maintaining it is an issue. It is very possible, provided that they maintain their flocks and exercise their religious freedom, so they tend to reject everything that undermines their established religious beliefs.28

As for the outer Tibet region (Qinghai and Sikiang), the Canadian Foreign Ministry believes that the possibility of its penetration by the communists is very real, and the Mongols influenced by communism may have already penetrated the region, as most of them are concentrated in Qinghai and they are dissatisfied with the authority of the monasteries and are demanding that they distribute their money to the general public. The reason for this is because they belong to the Kumbum Temple, which is affiliated with the Panchen Lama, and this was in a state of constant conflict with the authority of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. The region includes a large number of Mongols. Some of them came to the region in 1920 as students studying in Buddhist temples, and their number reached 800 students. Relations between Tibet and Mongolia were strong, but they began to cool after the Soviet incursion into Outer Mongolia, and the Dalai's religious authority began to decline little by little. However, this did not prevent some Mongolians from coming to study in the Tibetan monasteries affiliated with the Dalai Lama, most of them from the Baikal and Irkutsk regions in Siberia, and some Buriat Mongols, while it is believed that most of these are agents whose goal is to spread communism in Tibet.29-30

I do not think that communism during the year 1920 was strong enough to recruit monks for the purpose of spreading communism. Rather, the Communist Party was in the process of being established. This could have been the case if the document referred to before that year, that is, after the Communist Party took power in China in 1949.22

The third topic: Canada's position on the Chinese communist occupation of Tibet in 1950.31

After communism tightened its grip on China following the withdrawal of the Kuomintang to the island of Taiwan, communist statements began calling for the liberation of all Chinese lands and their unification within the circle of communist control. The communist leaders, led by Mao Zedong, referred to this many times, and Beijing Radio also announced a statement about the government. The Chinese demand the reunification of the country and the inclusion of all Chinese regions within national sovereignty. It states, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territory, including Tibet..." (32)

The Indian Prime Minister indicated in a statement to the Hindustan Times newspaper on October 29, during his visit to Srinagar (the capital of Kashmir), that he said, "It is not yet clear to know China's intentions towards Tibet, and that Chinese forces have been stationed in some areas of eastern Tibet... and that the Chinese government is full of With unjustified fears that the United States of America intends to destroy the communist experiment and the regime in China, he pointed out that this information was obtained by the Chinese regime from sources in Moscow, and that decision-makers in Beijing rely heavily on the information received from Moscow, and Moscow has repeatedly claimed that interference (The Anglo-American) aims to drag Tibet into the anti-communist front, so this false information influenced the Chinese decision and pushed it to head to Tibet."33

The Canadian Foreign Ministry tried to collect as much information as possible to clarify the legal aspect of the Tibetan issue, and to study the Chinese claims therein. As a result, it asked the British government to provide it with comprehensive information about the history of the Tibetan issue. The Canadian High Commissioner in India worked to approach the British side for the purpose of providing them with a letter. It is confidential, entitled "Tibetan Precis," which was written by Mr. H.E. Richardson (a representative of the British government in Lhasa) and published by the British government in New Delhi in 1948. The volume contains the Simla Agreement and its maps and includes all the discussions that took place between the two sides, and it contains an extensive historical narrative. On the Tibetan issue until the outbreak of World War II, the Canadian High Commissioner stated that he obtained a copy of these documents, but from sources other than those he mentioned previously, and they do not carry any security prohibitions. These documents include Article 9 of the agreement between Great Britain and China, and they lie The importance of these documents is that they contain maps that clearly show the borders of Tibet with China, and the McMahon line dividing inner and outer Tibet. It is evident in the maps that the inner Tibet region is much narrower than what other maps show. What these documents also show is the presence of the stamp (S.G.D) of Mr. A. Henry McMahon, the British Commissioner, did not show the presence of a seal or the name of the Chinese Commissioner. It appears that these maps were signed between the British and the Tibetans and were not ratified by the Chinese side. As for the original text of the Simla Agreement, it was mentioned in a series of volumes known as (the Aitchison Treaties). The Simla Treaty is mentioned in the fourteenth or fifteenth volume. The British Commission promised to give us a copy of it, but it later apologized.34

After the Canadian Foreign Ministry reviewed the special documents on the Tibetan issue, it indicated that the Chinese claim to annex Tibet and consider it an integral part of its territory is unacceptable and unfounded. Canada acknowledges Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, although the matter was not conclusive at all, but the facts available to it show that Since the past forty years, specifically since 1911, Tibet has controlled its internal and external affairs, and has called for the international community to recognize it as an independent state.35

The Chinese forces moved to take control of Tibet in October 1950. Press reports indicated that the Chinese forces moved in four brigades, three of which moved towards the east, specifically to the Gyantse Dzong area, which is 200 miles southwest of Shubandu and 90 miles east of Lhasa. As for the advanced forces, To the Reting area, which is 60 miles northeast of the capital, Lhasa. As for the 4th Brigade, it moved from Khotan in Xinjiang to approach Lhasa from the west.36

The number of Tibetan military forces defending was about 10 thousand fighters, and its formations were divided into 15 infantry regiments and an artillery company, and about 4-6 thousand fighters were concentrated in the eastern border area. The main weapons were 2.7-inch rifles, which are old weapons. As for the forces They are poorly trained and do not have the morale to fight.37

As for the Chinese forces, they are excellently equipped, and they number about 20,000 fighters stationed in northern Tibet, and about 40,000 fighters in the northeast, under the command of General Peng The Huai, and 80,000 soldiers stationed in the east, under the command of General Liu Bu. Cheng (Lio po-Cheng), so the Canadian Foreign Ministry believes that the Tibetan resistance will not be effective, and that the United Nations cannot intervene to prevent the Chinese aggression against Tibet, and that the only party capable of intervening to prevent the aggression is India, but it announced that it will not make any response to The Chinese attack, so all conditions are favorable for the Chinese government to control Tibet by military means or any other means.³⁸

During the period of the Chinese invasion, the Canadian government was in contact with the Tibetan government, and although the information received was limited, it did obtain a report indicating the retreat of the Tibetan forces in the Pemba region east of Shubandu towards Lhasa. This indicates the fall of the Ludozong and Shubandu regions into the hands of Chinese forces.²⁸

The Tibetan government appealed to the United Nations and all of them (India, the United States, and Britain) to take action to stop Chinese operations against their country. It sent a protest to the United Nations on October 7, 1950, asking them to intervene quickly to stop the Chinese advance on Tibet. It also wanted to send a delegation to the United Nations to obtain the approval of member states to join it. Canada has sensed the positions of the relevant countries. The Canadian High Commissioner in India indicated on November 16, 1950 that the American ambassador to India, Mr. Henderson, held a press conference in Calcutta in which he indicated that the United States does not interfere in the Tibet issue through the Security Council, while the ambassador stated The British man in India, Mr. Kenneth Younger, said that his country does not embrace interference in China because it is a sovereign state, and they do not encourage the Tibetans to send a delegation to the United Nations. As for India, it did not want the presence of a communist state on its borders, and it informed the Beijing government that the Chinese move would affect relations. Indo-Chinese in the future.^{39,41}

But the Canadian delegate objected to the Anglo-American justifications, and said that it is difficult to consider non-interference as an issue that affects Chinese sovereignty, as the Chinese have not achieved their sovereignty over Tibet at any time, and if China possesses the right to sovereignty, what is the justification for entering into negotiations with the Tibetans in 1912 and after? Moreover, sending military forces to resolve the issue of accession is clear evidence that this spot is not under Chinese sovereignty and is not part of its territory. Therefore, Canada called on the international community to stand against China and recognize Tibet as an independent state.⁴²

After the Tibetan leaders despaired of help from the international community, they agreed to enter into direct discussions with the Chinese side. The two sides entered into lengthy discussions in which China imposed its conditions on Tibet. The discussions emphasized China's control over foreign affairs and the presence of its forces in any part of Tibet, while The Tibetan government manages internal affairs, and as a result the Tibetans agreed to these conditions under duress, and entrusted the task of ratifying them to the Dalai Lama. The American PTI-Reuter agency indicated on July 19, 1951 that the Dalai Lama was obligated to sign the agreement, otherwise the Chinese They will either kill him and install the Panchen Lama, and the latter will be authorized to sign the agreement, or the Dalai will flee Tibet to avoid any personal operation against him.⁴³⁻⁴⁵

The Canadian Foreign Ministry assessed the harms and benefits of Chinese control over Tibet, and proposed alternative plans to resolve the crisis, which are as follows:

First: Disadvantages of Chinese control over Tibet:

- 1- China gains few economic interests as a result of its control over Tibet.
- 2- It will not gain significant human power that could serve it to strengthen its military forces, as it has a surplus of that, and it will not obtain useful military equipment.
- 3- China will exhaust its resources if it tries to directly control Tibet, as it is a poor region and in great need of development.
- 4- China cannot use it as an important air force in the region because of its altitude and the rugged terrain.

5- Its land is not suitable for making it a base for ground forces or a starting point for launching operations against India due to the rugged, mountainous nature of the land and the difficulty of ensuring communication there.

Second: The benefit of China's control over Tibet:

- 1- This will strengthen Mao Zeitung's political standing and make him a leader for all Chinese.
- 2- This control facilitates the spread of communism to India, especially through Ladakh, which is affiliated with Kashmir, as this region is distinguished by the fact that it is intellectually and culturally subordinate to the Tibet region.⁴⁶
- 3- It may divert popular attention from Formosa, as a communist attack on that island would lead to great dangers.

Third: China has alternative plans to open war, which are as follows:

- 1- Negotiations with the Tibetan government with political, economic and military pressure, forcing the Tibetan government to yield to Chinese demands.⁴⁷
- 2- Providing support for the Panchen Lama and his supporters and securing their control over Tibet, by encouraging civil war if necessary.
- 3- Reducing the control of the Tibetan government by encouraging dissident monasteries such as Sirachi Monastery.

The fourth section: Canada's position on political developments in Tibet 1959-1969.⁴⁸⁻⁴⁹

In 1958, some Tibetan representatives wrote a memorandum to the Canadian government in which they explained the development of events after Chinese control. They mentioned that Tibetan families were forced to leave their homes for fear of communist forces, as approximately 30,000 people were displaced from the southern regions, and most of them lived in desert areas. After China signed the treaty with the Tibetan government, it worked to settle four million Chinese citizens in the northern and northeastern regions of Tibet. The Chinese were not satisfied with that, but they turned Tibet into a huge arsenal of weapons that has no purpose other than launching an attack on neighboring countries, and they are building military barracks. And forts, bridges and airports in strategic areas. The Chinese government is moving towards building railways and roads, the aim of which is to speed up the movement of their forces. Therefore, the legal position of Tibet differs from other newly independent countries such as India, as India was subject to direct British control for more than one hundred and fifty years. The United Nations has recognized it as an independent state, so how about us, the people of Tibet, who have not been subject to any external control? How can the countries of the world not stand by us? Why does the United Nations stand in our case far from justice and peace? How can they justify the brutal actions of the communist regime? So... We call on the Canadian government to help our people achieve their rights.⁵⁰

Canada did not take a specific position on the Tibetan issue. Rather, it always sought the opinions of what it called (relevant countries), meaning (Britain and India). After the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947, the greatest burden fell on the Indian government, but the latter did not want The direct clash with China for the sake of Tibet, but it maintained balanced relations with both sides. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made a statement in the Indian Parliament on August 20, 1958, in which he said, "I confirm that Tibet was an ideal region before the communist forces arrived there, but the international community looked It is considered an area under Chinese control, so our legal position was in line with international positions."⁵¹

The Indian position on the Tibetan issue was based on not provoking China or entering into a useless war with it. India is a large country suffering from a stifling population density and clear economic poverty, in addition to internal political problems, and problems and remnants of the war with Pakistan. Therefore, opening a new door will lead to This led to major consequences that India could not bear, so it resorted to accepting the fait accompli and not provoking China regarding Tibet.⁵²

Canadian documents indicated that unrest occurred in 1959 after the Dalai Lama was invited to the Chinese military headquarters in Lhasa to attend a ceremony there. There, propaganda spread that Chinese forces would arrest the Dalai Lama and send him to China, causing unrest inside Tibet, protests, and

shootings against Chinese forces. Chinese forces responded to that attack, and the fate of the Dalai Lama was not known at that time.

There was a great possibility that the Dalai Lama would escape to India, and it seems that the Chinese had allowed him to do so to avoid more bloodshed, and that his arrest would cause great embarrassment to the Chinese.

The recent unrest was a surprise to the Chinese. Rather, this uprising constituted a wound to their pride due to the Tibetans' lack of gratitude for what they called the "gentle treatment" they received from the Chinese - as they put it - and some foreign sources indicated that the reason for this uprising was the Tibetans' aversion to Chinese reforms, in addition to their hatred of the Chinese. The general population.⁵³

China was suffering from major internal economic problems, so the Chinese government exploited the Tibet issue in order to distract its people from the problems and government failures that it had failed to address. The Shinghua News Agency presented the political developments and unrest in Tibet as direct foreign interference in the Chinese situation, and also pointed to the role of the Indians in Therefore, the Chinese raised anti-Indian slogans during the Canton Trade Fair and hung banners reading, "Expel Indian expansionists."⁵⁴

The Chinese government asked the Panchen Lama to return to Tibet to fill the spiritual and temporal position of the Dalai Lama, and to give legitimacy to their presence. The Panchen Lama praised Chinese reforms in Tibet, during a welcome banquet held by the Working Committee of the Communist Party of China in Tibet and the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region and the leadership of Military Region in Tibet The Panchen Lama told Xinhua News

Agency, "It has become necessary now, more than ever, to implement reforms in Tibet and continue reconstruction after the defeat of the militants." Zhang Qingwu said in his welcoming speech, "The task before us now is to implement democratic reforms that... "The people of Tibet urgently demand the complete elimination of the rebellion. We welcome the return of the Panchen Lama to lead the work in Tibet, and we are convinced that this task will be successfully completed under the wise leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chairman Mao Zedong and the Central People's Government, with full and unwavering reliance on the toiling masses.³⁶

Canada's position on the Tibetan issue in the Security Council 1960-1969.

Mr. C.J. Small, Trade Commissioner for the Canadian Government, advised the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Far East Department that Canada should take advantage of China's absence from the Security Council and condemn its aggression against the Tibetan people, or that pressure be put on China by bargaining with it to accept its membership in the United Nations in exchange for stopping its aggression, but Canada She was very careful about not provoking the Chinese government.

In August 1960, Malaysia and Thailand requested that the Tibetan issue be included on the agenda of the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. They called on the international community to respect the rights of the Tibetan people and stop aggression and human rights violations. The General Assembly had refused to include the Tibetan issue on the agenda of the fourteenth session. Due to the objection of the Soviet Union and a number of member states, as about 40% of all members expressed their denunciation of the actions of Chinese communism in Tibet, and approximately one-third of the members, including the United Kingdom, France, most Latin American countries, and most Asian countries, abstained from voting on the inclusion resolution, and it was Their reasons for rejection are as follows:

- 1- Doubt about the legal status of Tibet, and therefore it falls outside the powers of the United Nations and is in violation of Article 2/7 of the Assembly Law.
- 2- There are no Chinese representatives in the Assembly, and this prevents the other side from forming a vision of the issue.
- 3- Any decision taken may increase tension and affect future reconciliation between the two parties.

Although Canada voted on the General Assembly resolution to condemn China and accuse it of violating human rights, it did not succeed in implementing the resolution due to voting against the resolution, which led to its disruption.

The Dalai Lama took advantage of Canada's sympathetic position and the Tibetan issue. On October 28, 1961, he sent a letter to the Canadian Prime Minister (John DiefenBaker) thanking him for Canada's sympathetic position and the cause of his people, and asked him to support the resolution proposed by Malaysia and Thailand in the Security Council to condemn the Chinese aggression against Tibet. The text of the letter stated: "...I have The situation in Tibet has become very dangerous, and as the Prime Minister of India said, it is very strange for such a large number of displaced Tibetans to flow into India, so there must be an international decision to stop the death and destruction in Tibet, otherwise there will be no country called Tibet and there will be no country left. Tibetans at all, so I ask Your Excellency and your government to persuade the United Nations to take peaceful measures that will lead to an end to the horrific tragedy we are experiencing. We know that Canada, on several occasions, has played a pioneering role in supporting the rights of small countries around the world, and I hope that your government will not reject this appeal of mine." 51

Malaysia and Thailand re-raised the issue on August 18, 1961, and requested that the issue be discussed in the General Committee before submitting it to the United Nations General Assembly at its fifteenth session. The Canadian Foreign Minister proposed sending the proposed resolution to the General Committee for the purpose of discussing it and voting to submit it to business. The General Assembly, and accordingly, the proposal was referred to the aforementioned committee, and a vote of eleven votes supported the inclusion of the proposal, four objected, including the Soviet Union, and four members abstained. Therefore, the General Committee recommended that the proposal be considered in the proposed session of the General Assembly, and Canada took the same position that it took in the session. The previous term of the Assembly worked to condemn the Chinese aggression against Tibet, but its fear was that Tibet's neighbors would not condemn the Chinese aggression, which would weaken its position during the discussions. It also called for the formation of a committee to investigate the Tibetan issue.

Most members of the General Assembly condemned Chinese actions in Tibet, but no resolution was reached condemning China for violating human rights for the same reasons mentioned in the fourteenth session of the Assembly's meetings and for the objection of the Soviet Union. Therefore, friendly countries, including Canada, failed to condemn China for violating human rights. But the matter did not stop there. Canada, El Salvador, Malaysia, Ireland, Thailand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and others asked the United Nations and the General Assembly to condemn China during the sixth session of its meetings without regard to the specialization of the issue and not to shirk its legal responsibilities, and when discussing the issue. It was also objected to by the Soviet Union, and the latter presented three arguments to reject the decision, which are as follows:53

- 1- The Tibet issue has become one of the issues used by major powers as part of the Cold War.
- 2- Tibet is an integral part of China, and it is not within the powers of the General Assembly under Article 2/7 to discuss the issue because it is outside its jurisdiction.
- 3- Chinese activities in Tibet aim to remove reactionary regimes and introduce democratic reforms.

Thus, countries friendly to the Tibetan government failed to issue a resolution condemning China due to Soviet objections, and the Tibet issue remained rejected every time it was discussed in the General Assembly.

Canada tried to start a campaign to help the Tibetans in India by accepting their resettlement in Canada as humanitarian refugees, but the Canadian Foreign Ministry found that this issue must be dealt with with caution, especially since the Chinese are very sensitive to any action related to the Tibetan issue, and they completely reject the presence of the Tibetan government. In exile or the way any country deals with the Dalai Lama in his capacity as head of that government, and the Canadian Foreign Ministry noted the tension in Chinese-Swiss relations after the latter announced that it would receive Tibetan refugees, 41which Beijing condemned and considered a violation and interference in the internal Chinese situation, so the Far East Department referred to the Canadian government Working to accept immigration

applications, but without showing this in the media, and avoiding provoking the Chinese side. As for its position on raising the Tibetan issue in the General Assembly, it found that the matter could not be reached with a decision due to the opposition of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the lack of support for the decision from countries. The European Union and the neighboring countries of Tibet therefore called for not abandoning the Tibetan issue, but they must work not to be strict in any position that provokes the Chinese side, which would affect the relations of the two countries in the future, or affect the efforts made to open diplomatic relations with China.⁵⁵

Conclusion

The research concluded with a set of results that can be explained according to the following:

- 1- The Canadian documents provided a good understanding of the geographical importance of Tibet, and made it clear in their content that the main reason for the Chinese's tendency to control Tibet was its geographical location adjacent to India. In addition, India and neighboring countries felt the importance of the geographical location and the danger of Chinese control because this meant the arrival of communism at the doorstep of their countries. The possibility of it penetrating through Tibet is very likely.
- 2- It is shown in Canadian documents that the historical status of Tibet proves that it is an isolated region from China, and was not subject to any Chinese control before 1950. Therefore, it must be treated as an independent region and granted the right to self-determination, similar to the countries that emerged after 1945.
- 3- The Communists succeeded in penetrating Tibet at the following levels:
 - A - They succeeded, through communist propaganda, in preparing fertile ground for the communist presence in the religiously-characterized region of Tibet.
 - B - They succeeded in penetrating it militarily, and imposing unequal treaties on the Tibetan government, which gave them quasi-priority and quasi-recognition of their sovereignty over Tibet. T- They succeeded in winning the loyalty of many monasteries and lamas, led by the Bashen Lama.
- 4- India failed, due to the internal problems that we mentioned in the body of the research, to put an end to the communist incursion, or to persuade China not to occupy Tibet, or to grant them autonomy, at the very least.
- 5- The Tibetan government and its successors, the major powers, failed to persuade the international community in the Security Council to vote on it as an independent state in 1951, and that failure was due to two things:
 - A - The Communist Bloc's objection, and the Soviet Union's use of its veto power over every international resolution relating to Tibet.
 - B - Countries' fear of the Chinese reaction. Neighboring countries were openly afraid of China, while major countries such as the United States and Britain were afraid of Chinese accusations of interference in their internal situation, which would affect the course of the Cold War or escalate it.
- 6- The United Nations General Assembly failed to condemn China for committing crimes and violating human rights in Tibet, and the reason for this is the failure of major Asian countries to support the UN resolution and the Soviet Union's objection.
- 7- Canada sided every time and in all sessions of the United Nations General Assembly with any resolution condemning China, but that position did not affect the general decision of the Assembly.
- 8- Canada tried to settle Tibetan refugees and accept their asylum in Canada, but it was careful to do so secretly in order to avoid China's condemnation of the Canadian action as interference in its internal affairs.
- 9- Canada did not want to make the Tibet issue a pivotal issue in building relations with the Chinese side. Rather, it tried to take balanced positions in line with the illiterate international positions. It resorted to this after it became confident that the international community could find a solution to that issue.

References:

- 1-Department of National Defence, the strategic importance of Tibet, Chiefs of staff Committee, Joint intelligence committee, Ottawa, 6 October, 1950, p. 1.
- 2 -Ibid, p.3.
- 3-Ibid.
- 4- Ibid, p. 7.
- 5- Ibid, p. 9.
- 6 - Ibid, p8.
- 7 - The Grand Council: It is a political council whose mission is to supervise the political situation in Tibet and is known as the Kashag. It consists of a monk and three members of the nobles who do not belong to the monastic order, and each one of them is called a Chap. The first member of the council is called a Kalon, and he serves as the president of the council. Its powers are similar to those of the Council of Ministers, and the Council of Ministers is directly managed by the Dalai Lama. For more see:
- 8-Anis Mahmoud, Tibet between the Past and the Present, Dar Al-Hurriya, Beirut, 1959, p. 22.
- 9- The Panchen Lama: He is an incarnation similar to the incarnation of the Dalai Lama, and he is called in Buddhist literature the teacher of the Dalai Lama. The current Panchen is the tenth Panchen, and his name is Lobsang Trinli Londrup Chokye Gyaltsen. He was born in 1938 in the village of Karang in Amdo, and the communist government worked to bring him closer to it and grant him powers parallel to those of the Dalai. The Fourteenth Lama, about whom Mao Zedong said that the Tibetan people loved him greatly, and today he is in charge of the Chalhino Temple. For more see:
- 10-Center Tibet administration, from the heart of the Panchen lama (major speeches and a petition 1962-1989), The department of information and international relations, Dharamsala, India, 2003, P. 5.
- 11 - Department of National Defence, the strategic importance of Tibet, Political Factors, Ottawa, 6 October, 1950, p4.
- 12-To learn about the merits of the Cold War in Asia, see:
- 13-Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction, translated by Muhammad Fathi Khadr, Hindawi Foundation for Education and Culture, Egypt, 2012, pp. 43-61.
- 14 - Department of External Affairs, Secretary of State for External Affairs, To High Commissioner for Canada, March 7 1949, New Delhi, India, File 6209-40, p2.
- 15-The concept of a buffer state appeared in the seventeenth century, when major European powers began to discover and occupy other countries and establish empires over them. Due to their proximity to each other, problems between them increased, so they decided to leave certain areas of the empires to serve as a buffer state that maintains balance in the region. Potter Bateman defined it as a weak, small state, located between two or more strong states, and working to prevent international aggression. For more see:
- 16-Noura Abbeh, Abdel Nasser Nasser, The Role of the Geopolitical Determinants of the Buffer State in Regional Conflicts: The Ukrainian Crisis as a Model, Aleppo University Research Journal, Issue 41, 2020, pp. 4-5. ; Nour Alwan, The Buffer State: Imaginary Borders, Threatened Rule, and Systematic Fragility, 2019, p. 1.
- 17- Department of National Defence, the strategic importance of Tibet, external relations, Ottawa, 6 October, 1950, p5.
- 18- Ibid, January 8, 1944, p1.
- 19- For information about the civil war and internal problems, see:
- 20Zainab Jabbar Sharhan Al-Hasnawi, The American Position on the Chinese Civil War (1944-1949), unpublished master's thesis, University of Basra, College of Education for the Humanities, 2008.
- 21 - Department of External Affairs, Secretary of State for External Affairs, To High Commissioner for Canada, March 7 1949, New Delhi, India, File 6209-40, p2.
- 22 - Ibid, p1. 23- Ibid, p2.

24-The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. The beginnings of the establishment of the party were by a group of young people who called their movement the Marxism Study Group in 1918. Then the Enlightenment Society was established in the city of Tientsin in 1919. Then another group was formed known as the Social Sciences Study Group and included one hundred members from Marxists and socialists, then they organized themselves in 1920 and called their movement the Communist Group and founded a newspaper they called the Communist Party, the first issue of which appeared on 11/7/1920. As for the first conference of the Communist Party, it was held at the French School in Shanghai in 1921, and that year was The true birth of the Chinese Communist Party. For more see:

25-Milad al-Megrahi, *Modern and Contemporary History of Asia: East Asia, China, Japan, Korea*, Gan Yunus University Publications, Benghazi, 1997, pp. 101-102.

26 - After the communists succeeded in controlling China, the Soviet Union recognized the new Chinese government, and it was the first country to recognize the new Chinese regime. Then India followed, which blessed the Chinese revolution. Nehru praised it by saying, "It is a stable revolution with popular power," and demanded that the United Nations accept it as a member. Pakistan was the third country to recognize it, and it was the first Islamic country to recognize the Chinese communist regime, and it exchanged diplomatic relations with it on January 4, 1950, that is, less than four months after its establishment.

27- according to:

28-Center Tibet Administration, *Facts about the 17 point agreement between Tibet and China*, Department of Information and International Relation, India, 2001, P.1.

29 - Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, November 1, 1950, document No. 483.

30- The British government in India, through High Commissioner Sir McMahon, presented to the Chinese side a proposal to resolve the border crisis between China, Tibet and India in October 1913. The British negotiator tried to adopt the conference map to demarcate the border between Ladakh and Tibet, by allowing the Tibetans to extend their border referred to as the Red Line. To the northwest, and if the Chinese accept this, they will find that they have recognized the borders of Tibet and Aksai Chin. The proposal also included Britain's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet after dividing it into two halves: internal Tibet, administered by China, and external Tibet, which enjoys autonomy. China rejected the proposed proposals and its delegation withdrew from the aforementioned conference. However, this did not prevent the British from holding secret discussions with the Tibetan side, through which they drew the borders between India and Tibet. The first version of the agreement and its maps appeared in November 1913, and it recognized the McMahon Line, which defined the borders between India and Tibet, starting from Bhutan and heading towards East as an official border between them, but the Chinese rejected the agreement and called the McMahon Line the illegal border line. For more information about the Simla Agreement and its maps, see:

31-Asterlamb, *Kashmir, a Disputed Inheritance 1846-1990*, translated by: Suhail Zakkar, Damascus, 1992, p. 93. ; Abdel Moneim Abdel Wahab, *Geography of Political Relations*, AlWahda Foundation, Kuwait, undated, p. 227.

32 - Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, November 7, 1950, document No.494.

33 - Message from the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada to the Canadian Ambassador Washington, November 21.

34 - Message from the high commission for Canada, New Delhi, India, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, November 7, 1950, doc. No 243.

35 - Department of National Defence, the strategic importance of Tibet, Armed Forces, Ottawa, 6 October, 1950, p10.

36 - Ibid, p. 10.

37 - Message from the high commission for Canada, new Delhi, India, to the secretary of state for external affairs, Ottawa, November 7, 1950, doc. No 243.

38 - For details of the Chinese invasion and the Tibetan position on it, see:

39- Anis Mahmoud, previous source, pp. 23-34.

- 40 - Department of National Defence, the strategic importance of Tibet, Armed forces, Ottawa, 6 October, 1950, p10.
- 41 - Message from the High Commission for Canada, new Delhi, India, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Chinese Invasion of Tibet, November 16, 1950, doc. No513.
- 42 -Ibid.
- 43 - Message from Secretary of State for external affairs Canada, to the Canadian Ambassador Washington, Tibet.
- 44-The Tibetan government sent a delegation to negotiate with China, and the delegation granted the powers of the Dalai Lama. During the discussions, the Seventeen Agreement was signed, which included seventeen points in its terms, regulating the administration of the region between the Chinese and Tibetan governments. For more see:
- 45-Muntaser Hassan Dhairab, War at the Top of the World: The Buddhist Communist Conflict in Tibet, Dar Masameer for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Iraq, 2021, pp. 192-193.
- 46 - Memorandum for Prime Minister, Political Unrest in Tibet, March 24, 1959, P.3.
- 47 - Message from Office of the high commission for Canada in India, To the Under Secretary of state for external affair, Canada, Tibet, September 5, 1951, post file No. 24-60, Letter No. 921.
- 48 - Department of National Defense, the Strategic importance of Tibet, Conclusion, Strategic Importance, Ottawa, 6 October, 1950, P.p. 11-12. .
- 49 - message from the Representatives Tibet, to the Governor General of Canada, August 5, 1958, P.p1-2.
- 50 - Muntaser Hassan Dhairab, War Without Peace: A Seo-Historical Study of the Kashmiri Issue, Dar Masameer for Printing and Distribution, Iraq, 2021, pp. 28-48.
- 51- Department of External Affairs, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Tibet, June 23, 1959, Letter No. 25, p. 1.
- During that period, China suffered from major problems on the political and economic levels. The reforms called for by Mao Zedong returned the opposite. The Great Leap Forward reforms failed and claimed the lives of millions of Chinese people. Therefore, the Chinese government tried to draw the people's attention and occupy them with matters other than their failures. economic, so he focused on the Tibetan issue as a way out of his crises. For more see:
- 52-Fatima Jassim, graduates of Al-Absawiya, The Soviet-Chinese Dispute 1956-1969, Historical Study, Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Basra, College of Education for Girls, 2012, pp. 43-53.
- 53- Department of External Affairs, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Tibet, June 23, 1959, Letter No. 25, p2. Department of External Affairs, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Tibet, June 23, 1959, Letter No. 25, p1.
- 54- Department of External Affairs, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Tibet, June 23, 1959, Letter No. 25, p4.- Department of External Affairs, The Question of Tibet, Part ii, August 31,1961, P.p 1-3..
- 55- John Devin Baker: He was born in September 1895 in the city of Neustadt. He is the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party. He worked as a lawyer and was chosen in 1936 as leader of the Conservative Party in Saskatchewan. He was elected a member of the House of Commons in 1940, became leader of the party in 1956, and Prime Minister of Canada for a term (1957/1963), he died in 1979. For more, see: