

LIQUIDATION OF THE EMIRATE OF BUKHARA

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Annotation: This article highlights the issues of the internal situation of the Emirate of Bukhara, the movement of the Young Bukharians against the power of the emir at the beginning of the 20th century.

Key words: Abdulvakhid Burkhanov, AbduraufFitrat, SadridinAini, Fayzulla Khodzhaev, Usman Khodja, Abdukadyr Mukhitdinov, Musajan Saidzhanov, Young Bukharians, Bukhara, Shakhrisabz, Jadids.

At the beginning of the XX century, two opposing forces have formed in the public life of Bukhara: on the one hand, these are the Young Bukharians, who saw and understood the need for a democratic restructuring of the political life of Bukhara, the development of the economy, the inclusion of the state in a number of leading countries, and on the other, these are religious conservative fanatics, opponents of everything new and transformation of the state[1].

The Young Bukharians began their activities as a political movement in 1910, being prominent representatives of the progressive reformers of Bukhara (AbdulvakhidBurkhanov, AbduraufFitrat, SadridinAyni, FaizullaKhodzhaev, Usman Khodja, AbdukadyrMukhitdinov, MusadzhanSaidzhanov, etc.), striving to save Bukhara from the obsolete emir rule and establish a republic. Young Bukharians organized new method schools in Bukhara, developed and published various textbooks and teaching materials for them. The newspapers "Bukhor-i-Sharif" and "Turan" were published, in which, along with the rescue of the people from the shackles of ignorance and calls for enlightenment, the ideas of national freedom and independence were promoted[2].

The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia and the political activation generated by it in the life of the Emirate of Bukhara lead to the decision of the Emir to carry out some reforms. In March 1917, the supreme qazi in the emir's office promised to carry out reforms. He announced the decree of the emir, which in fact did not change the basis of the existing system, but only slightly improved the situation of the people. The decree dealt with the creation of a stable foundation of justice, as well as withholding kharaj, zakat and other taxes. Attention was also paid to the development of industry and trade. Officials were forbidden to charge additional fees in the performance of their official duties. A system of fixed wages established by the state was introduced. "And after what we have said," the decree said, "according to Sharia law, the necessary measures will be taken to develop and encourage useful knowledge."

Also, the emir promised, in addition to his treasury, to form a separate state treasury, to determine a budget that clearly fixes income and expenses for public needs. Promises were made to open a printing house and release prisoners from zindans. For these purposes, it was planned to elect a "nation" that would convene an "assembly" of "clear-thinking and just" people living in the capital[3].

Despite the fact that the decree was drawn up on the basis of big promises, it aroused big doubts. The leaders of the "Young Bukharians" (the committee for the implementation of the decree was called the Committee of the "Young Bukharians") failed to reach a mutual agreement on the points relating to reforms. MahmudhojaBehbudi, Mullakhan-ogly, Mirzo-Gulyam supported the decree, while radicalistsFaizullaKhodzhaev, AbduraufFitrat and UsmonKhodja demanded fundamental reforms, urging supporters to hold an immediate protest demonstration[4].

On April 1917, the Jadids organize demonstrations in Kerk and Bukhara. The Bukhara demonstration of 150 people was led by FaizullaKhodzhaev and AbduraufFitrat. Along with the slogans and calls "Long live the Emir!" Other calls were made: "Khurriyat, Adolat, Musavvat!" - "Freedom, Justice, Equality!" As soon as the demonstrators reached Ark, the emir's sarbazes received an order to stop them. 200 foot soldiers and 300 mounted soldiers dispersed the demonstration and arrested the participants. In addition, the Ark was occupied by 7 thousand mullahs who opposed the reforms. The mullahs threatened to kill anyone who approached them. The demonstrators were stoned, beaten and insulted. More than 30 demonstrators were arrested and many were injured. Those who were lucky enough to escape the massacre survived by moving to other cities, most to Tashkent.

The events in Bukhara were a lesson for the Jadids. Said Alimkhan, who was considered an enlightened ruler, lost the respect of the people. The Jadids, who managed to avoid arrest, went to Turkestan, occupied in 1917 by the Bolsheviks. The left "Young Bukharians", who settled in Tashkent, in January 1920, under the leadership of FaizullaKhodzhaev, created the "Central Bureau of Young Bukharian Revolutionaries in Turkestan". However, this organization did not include authoritative political forces, but turned into a means of struggle for the Bolsheviks, who sought to completely conquer Central Asia and include it in their composition[4].

The Young Bukharians, under the leadership of FaizullaKhodzhaev, together with the Bolsheviks, prepared a coup d'état in Bukhara. Measures were taken to disperse the emir's troops. Campaign work was carried out among the

population. For these purposes, the magazine "Tong" ("Dawn") and the newspaper "Uchkun" - ("Spark") were established and published[5].

The "Young Bukharians" took decisive political and propaganda measures to overthrow the emir from the throne. On their initiative, on August 29, 1920, an uprising was organized in Chardzhou. The Provisional Revolutionary Committee, created here, appeals to the Russian government for help. The Soviet government is transferring large military forces to Bukhara, consisting of well-armed units, military aircraft, which terrifies the local population. The emir's troops were unable to offer practically no resistance. Combat operations of the Red Army units of the Turkestan Front begin, under the command of M.V. Frunze, with the Young Bukharians and Bukhara communists (about 5 thousand people), with the aim of overthrowing the Emir of Bukhara on August 29 - September 2, 1920. The emir's army (16 thousand people) occupied the area of Old Bukhara with the main forces and separate detachments - Khatyrchi and Kermin. In the area of the Takhtakaracha pass, Shakhrisabz and Karshi, detachments of Bukhara beks (over 27 thousand people) operated. On August 23, the Young Bukharians and Bukhara communists started an uprising in the Chardzhuibekstvo and turned to the Turkestan Soviet Republic for help. The Bukhara operation began with the capture on August 29, by the Soviet troops, together with the rebels of Old Chardzhuy. The Revolutionary Committee, created in Chardzhui, appealed to the population of Bukhara to fight against the emirate. On September 2, Old Bukhara was taken by storm, and on October 8, 1920, the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic was proclaimed[6].

The Bukhara operation under the command of Frunze M.V. in 1920 marked the beginning of a number of operations of the Red Army in Bukhara and in subsequent years. These operations were intended either to consolidate the initial success of the Bukhara operation, or to suppress local pockets of resistance. Difficult natural conditions and national specifics gave these operations a long-term character.

By the spring of 1920, there was a turning point in the struggle for power in Central Asia. The connection of the Turkestan Republic with the main territory of Russia was restored. The 4th Army of the Turkestan Front eliminated pockets of resistance in the Transcaspien region. In the Fergana region, one of the brightest leaders of the national movement, MadaminBek, goes over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The relative pacification of the region was also facilitated by the change in the policy of the Bolsheviks in Turkestan, the active involvement of national personnel in the management. In the summer of 1920, the troops of the Red Army liquidated the Khiva Khanate, on the site of which the pro-Soviet Khorezm People's Soviet Republic was formed. But peace was still very far away. In the Ferghana Valley, the resistance of the local population continued, peasant and Cossack uprisings continued in the Semirechye, which tied the forces of the 3rd Turkestan division in 1920, and constant danger threatened the Khorezm Republic from the leader of the Turkmens, Junaid Khan. In addition, the Red Army had the task of protecting the land borders of Soviet Turkestan for several thousand kilometers. In addition to the fight against the Basmachi, the leadership of the RSFSR aimed to establish Soviet influence in Central Asia as a counterweight to Great Britain, which pursued an active policy in neighboring Afghanistan, which also served as one of the reasons for overthrowing the emir. After an unsuccessful attempt by the leader of the Turkestan Bolsheviks, Kolesov, together with a detachment of Young Bukharians, to overthrow the government of the emir, a truce reigned between Bukhara and Tashkent, behind the facade of which both sides were preparing for a decisive battle. The government of the Emir of Bukhara was comprehensively engaged in strengthening its own armed forces. Pro-Emir clerics increasingly called on parishioners to ghazavat. In February 1920, the emir's government launched a mobilization campaign. At the court of the emir, former officers of the tsarist army and members of the White movement found refuge. The government of the Turkestan Republic, meanwhile, tried in every possible way to unite all the anti-Emir forces, which was partly successful. By 1920, the left wing of the Young Bukharians, headed by FaizullaKhodjaev, had noticeably strengthened. In August 1920, armed demonstrations took place in a number of cities of the Bukhara Khanate with appeals of the rebels for help to the government of Turkestan. Meanwhile, for the time being, both sides tried to maintain the appearance of neutrality. Back in March 1920, Frunze stated at a meeting with the emir that Soviet Russia "is interested in the territorial integrity of Bukhara to the highest degree[7].

Armed forces, their deployment and plan of operation. On the 10th of August, the emir gathered significant regular and regular forces (about 30-35 thousand) to Bukhara. By August 20, 1920, the emir's armed forces consisted of units of the regular army and the regular militia. The forces of the regular army were determined at 8,725 bayonets and 7,580 sabers with 23 light guns and 12 machine guns. The irregular forces deployed by the regional rulers (beks), according to a rough estimate, numbered 27,000 bayonets and sabers with 2 machine guns and 32 guns. Most of the artillery consisted of obsolete models (for example, smooth-bore cast-iron cannons that fired cast-iron or stone cannonballs). Fighting qualities, training of soldiers and commanders of the emir's army were at a low level. The army was staffed with mercenaries, and an attempt to replenish the army through compulsory conscription did not give the expected results. Recruitment to the army was carried out by forced apportionment in rural communities. The latter in many cases either got rid of an element that was undesirable for them in this way, or committed a number of abuses by appointing members of low-income families to the army, without regard to their family and financial situation[8].

By the time of decisive hostilities, the main forces of the emir were concentrated in 2 places. The regular Bukhara army is in the capital of Old Bukhara and its immediate environs. Beks' troops in the Kitab-Shakhrisabz region, covering the Takhtakaracha pass. Through this pass passed the shortest and most convenient way from the city of Samarkand inland, through Guzar to Termez, adapted for wheel traffic along its entire length. The command of the Turkestan Front could allocate for the operation 6,000-7,000 bayonets, 2,300-2,690 sabers, 35 light and 5 heavy guns, 8 armored vehicles, 5 armored trains and 11 aircraft. This count does not include national military formations on the territory of Turkestan and

revolutionary-minded detachments of the Young Bukharians and Bukhara communists on the territory of Bukhara. The commander of the Turkestan Front, Frunze M.V., despite the passive resistance of a number of local councils to a possible war with Bukhara, begins active preparations for the overthrow of the emir. The main goal of the military operation was to be the densely populated valley of the river. Zeravshan with the political and administrative center of Bukhara and Shahrisyabz district with the center in the city of Guzar. The attack on Old Bukhara was also aimed at defeating the emir's main forces. On August 13, 1920, Frunze, in an order to the troops of the Turkestan Front, indicated that the general political situation required the Red Army to be ready to act actively when the interests of the revolution required it. In anticipation of this performance, the Chardzhui group was concentrated in the area of the city of New Chardzhui, consisting of the 1st infantry regiment, 1st Teke cavalry battalion and 1st light artillery battalion. This detachment was reinforced, in addition, by a detachment of the Bukhara revolutionary troops of Kulmstskhametov; the Amu Darya flotilla and the red garrisons of the cities of Chardzhui, Kerki and Termez also came under the command of the head of the detachment. The task of the detachment was to secure the immediate environs of Chardzhui and occupy the city of Karakul, which lay near the railway line halfway from Chardzhui to Old Bukhara. The special attention of the head of the detachment was entrusted with the railway line in his section. At the same time, the flotilla was supposed to carry cruising along the river. Amu Darya in the section from the fortification of Kerka to the fortification of Termez, not allowing any crossings on this section of the river in either direction. The Chardzhui group was operationally subordinate to the Samarkand group. This latter was divided into 3 separate groups: Kagan, consisting of all units that made up the garrison of the city of New Bukhara (Kagan) (7 rifle regiments, 3 1/2 cavalry regiments, 40 light and 5 heavy guns, based on the materials of Comrade Rozhdestvensky) and Karshi city; the 4th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st East Muslim Rifle Regiment, arriving from Turkestan, were also to be included in this group; the task of this group was to include the capture of the city of Old Bukhara. The Katta-Kurgan group, consisting of the 2nd International Cavalry Regiment with an artillery platoon and a detachment of Bukhara revolutionary troops, was to concentrate in the city of Katta-Kurgan no later than August 15; it was supposed to take Khatyrcha and Ziaetdin with it at the right time, and in the future - the city of Kermine. Finally, the Samarkand group itself, consisting of the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Regiment of the 1st Turkestan Cavalry Division, a separate Turkic cavalry brigade and an engineering company, was assigned, if necessary, to defeat the Bukhara troops in the Shakhrisyabz-Kitab direction and firmly occupy the area of the river. Kashkadarya. Subsequently, the order indicated the distribution and timing of the concentration of technical units and aviation. Quite characteristic is the indication of the order on the order of concentration of the Kagan group. The units assigned to reinforce it were to appear in the city of Kagan completely unexpectedly for the enemy, passing through the territory of Bukhara in echelons during the night. Thus, Frunze set himself two goals: he sought to do away with the political center of the Bukhara emirate and its most reliable support in the form of a regular army with one blow, choosing Old Bukhara as the object of his actions. On the other hand, he chooses as the goal of his actions a significant concentration of enemy forces formed in the Shakhrisyabz-Kitab region. It was not possible to leave him unattended or limit himself to putting up a barrier against him. However, given the already existing numerical inequality, for this it was necessary to further weaken the forces intended for operations against the capital. Fully aware of this, the front command balances the numerical inequality of forces with a grouping along the railway line[7].

The latter was completely in the hands of the Red Army, which made it possible to concentrate strike forces in the right place and at the right time. In addition, the attention of the enemy and his forces are diverted to 2 opposite directions: to Samarkand and to Chardzhui. In the initial position created for both sides, the emir's army was already in a strategic encirclement even before the start of hostilities, and the command of the Turfront took all measures to quickly turn this strategic encirclement into a tactical one. The spatiality of the theater, its lack of roads, waterlessness, difficult climatic conditions - all taken together should have influenced the duration and difficulty of operations, if the enemy was given time to use all these properties to his advantage. The characteristic features of the theater allowed the movements and actions of significant military units only in certain directions. These directions were sometimes significantly removed from each other. Hence the importance of the issue of communication and the difficulty of organizing and maintaining it. Under such conditions, the administration could not have the character of precise regulation of the movement of troops by day, with the setting of certain tasks for each day. In the field of management, emphasis was placed on the manifestation of the commander's initiative, giving him the general idea of the operation and providing a broad initiative in its implementation. Order of the commander of the Turfront No. 3667 of August 25, 1920. Events in the Bukhara Emirate developed rapidly. On August 25, the Bukhara communists, led by V. Kuibyshev, who was passing through there, raised an uprising against the Chardzhuibek and sent an appeal to Moscow asking for help and accession[7].

On the same day, the front command issued its order No. 3667, which determined the active assistance of the Red Army with the armed forces that had begun an uprising inside the emirate. The political goal of the operation was defined by Comrade Frunze as "revolutionary fraternal assistance to the Bukhara people in their struggle against the despotism of the Bukhara autocrat." The start of the operation was scheduled for the night of August 28-29. The Chardzhui group was supposed to assist the Bukhara rebels in capturing the city of Old Chardzhui, and then had to throw their cavalry at the Naryzym and Burdalyk crossings across the river. Amu Darya to intercept all the fugitives, including the emir and members of the government, if they tried to flee along these routes to Afghanistan. For the same purpose, it was necessary to capture the city of Karakul and the Yakki-tut railway station. Along with these actions of the detachment, the establishment of revolutionary power along the Amu Darya from the Khorezm border to Termez inclusive was achieved. The head of the Kagan group, Comrade Belov, upon receiving the first information about the revolutionary upheaval in Old Chardzhui, was supposed to move his units to the capital and the emir's country palace of Sitor Mahi Khasa (Makhasa), 5 km northeast of

Bukhara, where "with a decisive and crushing blow destroy all the military forces of the old Bukhara government and not allow the enemy to organize new resistance. The special task was to capture the emir himself and his government. Other groups and detachments were to carry out the tasks specified in the directive of August 12.

The task of the Samarkand detachment expanded in the sense that the 7th Infantry Regiment, which came at the disposal of this detachment, after the defeat of the enemy grouping in the Shakhriyabz-Kitab area, was to take possession of the Karshi-Guzar region in order to prevent the remnants of the Shakhriyabzbek's troops from leaving for Sherabad in the eastern mountainous beks. Further events began to develop within the time frame stipulated by this order[11].

On the night of August 28, the concentration of all the forces of the Kagan detachment ended. At the same time, the Bukhara revolutionaries captured the city of Old Chardzhui, and parts of the Chardzhui detachment of Comrade Nikitin moved to the crossings across the Amu Darya, Narazym and Burdalyk and captured them on August 31. At the same time, a special detachment as part of the 5th Infantry Regiment, consolidated company 8 The 1st Rifle Regiment and the division of the 16th Cavalry Regiment was moved from the city of New Chardzhuy to the city of Karakul. The Kagan group went on the offensive between 6 and 7 o'clock in the morning on August 29. She advanced in two columns. The right (eastern) included the 10th and 12th Tatar rifle regiments, the 1st cavalry regiment, four guns, the 53rd armored detachment, armored train No. 28. This column advanced from the city of Kagan along the highway and railway line to the southeastern part of the city wall, where the Karshi gates were located. The left column (western) as part of the 1st East Muslim Rifle Regiment, rifle and cavalry regiments of the special forces detachment with two light guns, having landed 14 km west of the station. Kagan, advanced on the southwestern Karakul city gates. Thus, the offensive was launched simultaneously on 2 opposite points, which cannot be considered correct, given the overall small number of Red Army forces. The artillery group, which consisted of a platoon of 152-mm fortress cannons on platforms and a 122-mm battery, was supposed to support the offensive of the right column. However, on the 1st day of the offensive, she was located at the maximum distance, so her fire had little effect. For the defense of each of the gates with adjacent sections of the city wall, the enemy had forces of up to 2,000 - 3,000 fighters and, in addition, a mobile reserve outside the city, in the area of Sitor Mahi Khasa (Mahasa), in the amount of up to 6,000 - 8,000 fighters. The columns slowly advanced over rough terrain, met with enemy fire and counterattacks, and on the first day of the offensive they only managed to get closer to the city fortifications, but could not capture them. On August 31, the Karakul detachment and the 2nd Infantry Regiment with 2 batteries approached the region of Old Bukhara. On this day, the leadership of the actions of all forces over Bukhara was united in the hands of the commander of the 1st Army, G. V. Zinoviev[12].

The command decided to deliver the main blow now to the Karshi Gates, preparations for the assault on which artillery fire began on August 30, and heavy artillery was pulled closer to the city. In total, 12 thousand shells were fired at the city, including many chemical ones. During August 31, the command of the group concentrated against the Karshi gates, near which at that time a breach had already been made, almost all of their forces, leaving in the left column only the rifle regiment (1st Eastern Muslim), the consolidated company of the 8th rifle regiment and the cavalry regiment special forces squad. At 5 o'clock on September 1, the right column moved to storm the Karshi Gates, which this time ended in success: after a stubborn street battle, by 17 o'clock on the same day, Old Bukhara passed entirely into the hands of the Soviet troops. However, the emir was no longer in the city. On the night of August 31, he left his capital under the protection of a detachment of 1000 people. and headed in a northeasterly direction to the city of Gydzh-Duvan. On September 2, M. V. Frunze sent a telegram to V. I. Lenin, which said: "The fortress of Old Bukhara was taken today by storm by the combined efforts of the Red Bukhara and our units. The last stronghold of Bukhara obscurantism and the Black Hundreds fell. The red banner of the world revolution victoriously flutters over the Registan. At the same time, the Kattakurgan and Samarkand detachments successfully coped with the tasks assigned to them in accordance with the directive of August 12. Further operations were reduced to the organization of the pursuit of the emir and his entourage. This task was initially undertaken by the commander of the 1st Army, G.V. Zinoviev: with a cavalry detachment, he chased the emir to the city of Karshi. However, the emir managed to slip between the red detachments pursuing him and find temporary shelter in Eastern Bukhara[10].

After the establishment of Soviet power in Bukhara, the Bolsheviks in all areas began to establish their own colonial order. The Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR for Turkestan Affairs (Turkcommission), having in practice unlimited powers, established its dominance in all spheres of life of the BNSR. On the basis of agreements concluded between the BNSR and the RSFSR, Bukhara was drawn into the sphere of interests of the Soviet government.

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