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On the Situation of Muslim Clergy in Uzbekistan in 1927 (According to the United State Political Administration Report)

Abstract

It should be noted that one of the most important issues facing the Soviet Union after the establishment of Soviet rule was the development of a new approach to Islam, the Muslim faith, and the appropriate political position in this regard.

Keywords: Administration, Approach, Political.

Introduction

This policy was officially reflected in the declarative statement of the Russian Council of People's Commissars (CPC) "To all Muslim workers in Russia and the East." According to the decree, the customs, beliefs, traditions, national and religious institutions of the Muslim population in Russia, including Turkestan, were declared "free and impartial".

The Main Results and Findings

The Bolsheviks pursued their policies towards the Muslim population in Russia, Siberia, Crimea, and the Caucasus, with a certain confrontation and due caution. The Soviet government had planned to maintain its power in this way, to make the Muslim population more and more benevolent to this power. It should be noted that in practice, this policy has not yielded much in the field.

However, the situation was different in Turkestan, where the majority of the population (90.29%) is Muslim. After the establishment of the Soviet power, the unilateral efforts of this government towards the Muslim population, regardless of their age-old values, beliefs and traditions, naturally had a negative impact on the

Muslim population. Protests and armed resistance intensified on the ground.

The leadership of the Turkestan ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), on the other hand, largely ignored the interests of the indigenous population.

Although the Russian UNHCR and ICC Commission (Turkic Commission, which operated until August 1922) and the Central Asian Bureau (Sredazbyuro 1922-1934) visited Moscow in 1919, they tried to coordinate the policy of the Soviet state and the Bolshevik Party in the region. The essence has largely been preserved. For the ruling system, the content of its existing Marxist-Leninist ideology was in sync with the above-mentioned issue. On the one hand, there was talk of mutual "respect for the faith, protection of the interests of Muslims", but on the other hand, in practice, the bloody and brutal wars of the Red Army, persecution and violence would cause the majority of indigenous peoples to revolt against Soviet rule. In Uzbekistan, this issue and its aspects have been studied in depth and comprehensively by many historians, in particular, H. Ziyoev, D. Alimova, R. Shamsutdinov, D. Ziyoeva, S. Agzamkhodjaeva, K. Rajabov and others. The Soviet government did not deny the "Muslim factor" from the very

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beginning, but also took some practical steps to attract the Muslim population to the side of the Soviet government and to do good deeds. In particular, on January 17, 1918, the "Internal Russian Commissariat for Muslim Affairs" was established under the signatures of the Chairman of the Soviet Government VI Lenin and the People's Commissar for National Affairs IV Stalin. Well-known Tatar public figure Mullanur Vakhitov (1885-1918) was appointed its head. The Soviet government had from the very beginning started a struggle against the Orthodox Church, which was the pillar of the former empire. Religious education and foundations were temporarily maintained in Muslim-populated areas with the aim of allying the Muslim population. In this regard, on the recommendation of the Commission for the Implementation of the Decree "On the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church", on November 20, 1918, by order of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR. However, shortly thereafter, by order of the People's Commissariat of Education of 14 December 1918 (No. 6486), the funding of Muslim schools was stopped and the confiscation of waqf property began. This was a sign of the Soviet state's two-pronged policy.

While the spread of Soviet ideas among the local population was unique, it became widespread during the New Economic Policy (NEP), which began in October 1921. This was the essence of the "cultural revolution".

However, organizations responsible for the security of the Soviet state, such as the All-Russian Emergency Committee (ACC) and the United State Political Administration (USPA), advocated an ideological-chauvinistic approach to the spiritual and religious situation in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan (since 1924).

In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention to a document that constitutes the original purpose of this article. This document, entitled "Muslim Spirituality in Central Asia", was sent to the Central Asian Bureau of the CPSU (b) on June 4, 1927 by L.N. Belsky, a representative of the OGPU in Central Asia. The analysis of this document plays an important role in the process of accurate and objective study of the religious and spiritual situation in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan at that time. The analysis of this document is also relevant, as it has not yet been considered as a separate object of study. It should be noted that in the same year, the same month, the VI Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was held, where the issue of Muslim clergy and religious schools was considered. The analysis presented in the article is mainly based on the example of Uzbekistan.

Earlier, the document said that the Communist Party did not deal with the issue of clergy properly, that it was only a matter of "from situation to situation", and only once tried to address this issue at the July 1925 plenum of the Central Asian Bureau. In many cases, the issue has been criticized for not being handed over to the party bodies. It is also noted that in the absence of sufficient information about the activities of the priests, it is necessary to go to the appropriate area to obtain such information. The author of the document said that the clergy were more active, in particular, the statement of the head of the Kokand clergy Turakhon Makhsum that "the clergy should be a mediator between the people and the government", the head of the Andijan clergy Sheikh Mawlavi followed him, comments on the follow-up.

In this regard, the document notes that the preaching of the clergy has a direct impact on the general population. In Asaka, for example, residents are protesting against the strict accounting of waqf property, demanding that the MIQ of Uzbekistan keep waqfs in the hands of priests. In Namangan, three village council chairmen will be replaced, and in Andijan, a local branch of the religious administration will hold a 300-person demonstration against the reading of non-religious sermons in mosques. In Chust, the priests call on the population against the women throwing veils.

The document emphasizes that the protests of the clergy against the regime are not limited to the Fergana Valley, but also throughout the country. Attention will also be paid to the issue of land and water reform. The injustices in the conduct of land and water reform are set aside, and the author focuses on the protests. In fact, the logical question of why they are resisting remains unanswered.

Among the scholars of Fergana are Turakhon Makhsum, Hidoyat Hoji Qoriev, Eshon Bobokhon from Kokand. Eshon Valikhanov from Urgut, well-known clerics from Tashkent Isakhon Alam, Shomuhitdin Axun and a number of other clerics and clerics say in their speeches that it is against the Shari'a for Muslims to take other people's lands by force. This will undoubtedly have its consequences on the ground. In many cases, the population refuses to take land, hides certain land masses, refuses to take the land of the rich, and so on. This, in turn, worries the local Soviet administration.

The document states that the clergy (including progressives) are a front and oppose the actions of the People's Commissariat of Education to expel religious subjects from schools.

For example, in January 1926 in Tashkent, a group of mullahs protested against such actions of the Soviet administration.

Indeed, the clergy acted together on matters of principle, in spite of certain differences between them.

According to the OGPU, by 1927 there were a total of 1,325 religious schools in Uzbekistan, with 19,487 students. The number of madrassas was 84, with 2,808 students. Most madrassas were located in Kokand district (37) and Andijan district (23). There were 1,477 religious schools throughout Central Asia during this period, with 190 madrassas with 21,809 students and a total of 2,978 students.

It should be noted that 1-1.5 years ago, the number of religious schools in Uzbekistan was 1,585. The largest number of them was in Khorezm -876. However, by 1917 the number of schools in the country was more than 5,600.

The document also considers the views of the "progressive" part of the clergy on the issue of education. Progressive clerics have called for the campaign to be intensified, with stories being published. In the light of the above comments, the OGPU accuses the clergy of three campaigns - land reform, school reform, and a direct negative attitude and opposition to the "Attack" process. The accusation even applies to a group of priests ("progressive priests") who are sympathetic to the Soviet government, and they are not trusted. In doing so, the special security service argues that the Soviet state's attitude toward religion was in fact a temporary tactical move by certain liberal policies of the NEP era. It should be noted that a year later, practical life confirms the "correctness" of this statement. Therefore, before starting a resolute struggle against the clergy, the document states that "it is necessary to determine who they are, what their components are, and what role they play in the social life of society, then and now". For this reason, the priests are first divided into three groups:

1. Priests in mosques - imam, imam-khatib, muazzin, qori.
2. Priests of education - mudarris, domla, teachers.
3. Priests of court cases - judge, scholar, mufti.

It is noted that those in groups 2 and 3 are usually referred to as "scribes". The document describes the clergy in the mosque as "the most backward part of the clergy." In many cases, it is noted that imams are appointed from among those who have completed half or half of the madrassa, and the influence of the mudarris who usually taught them would be great. In this regard, it is noted that in Tashkent many ordinary imams were under the influence of such teachers as Isakhan Azam and Shomuhitdin, in Samarkand - Qazi Isakhan, Domulla Salim, in Kokand - Turakhon Makhsum. The madrassa teacher achieved this status at the age of 40, because at the age of 30 he would graduate

from the madrassa and practice for another 7-10 years. At the appropriate time, after taking a lesson in the hands of a famous teacher, he would receive the title of teacher on his recommendation. Most teachers were usually educated in Bukhara madrassas. The document describes the Muslim judicial system as follows.

Judicial priests also had higher madrassa education. To this end, in the year of graduation from the madrassa, they studied Muslim jurisprudence in a special field. The judges did not have the level of mufti and scholarly knowledge.

In fact, they were often recruited under the influence of influential circles, the document said. As for the Eshans, the document states that they received this status in two different ways, namely through special training or inheritance. At the same time, it is said that most of the Eshans in the 1920s inherited this status without special training.

The document also touches on aspects related to foundations. The transfer of foundation property to the relevant Soviet agencies, the abolition of the judiciary, the introduction of the Soviet school education system among the local population, and the closure of large and popular madrassas often dealt a severe blow to the 2nd and 3rd groups of priests.

It is said that this layer of priests was forced to look for a place below, and now many influential priests began to claim to be imams of mosques, and some of them began to leave the city for the peaceful villages. This was a sign that by the second half of the 1920s, the influence and prestige of the clergy in the mosques had begun to increase. A group of priests, on the other hand, shifted from religious activities to secular intellectuals and began to support the Soviet government.

This document also mentions the activities of "bourgeois-nationalist intellectuals" on the example of Munavvarqori Abdurashidkhonov. This was evidenced by a special sentence issued by the special services to the bright representative of the Jadids as early as 1927. This is because the label "bourgeois-nationalist" alone would be enough to label the existing system as an "enemy element" since the late 1920s. Those who received the label "Enemy Element" are known to have fallen victim to Soviet repression.

The document describes the clergy as two groups: progressive ("progressive") and conservative, based on a stamp adopted in the Soviet Union, but on many issues, in particular, "repression", ie ideological leadership in the armed resistance movement, land reform, nation-state. restriction, school reform, etc. It is emphasized that these two groups as one front opposed the policy of the Soviet government.

This fact, that is, the lack of confidence in the clergy, who were sympathetic to the Soviet regime, is repeatedly mentioned in the document, especially on the above-mentioned issue. With this, the representatives of the special body repeatedly explained that there was no trust in the Muslim clergy in general by the Soviet government. The policy of "atheism", which began shortly afterwards, emerges as a practical response to the above considerations.

Already during the Russian Empire, there was a negative attitude towards the Muslim religious administration, and the colonial administration considered it against the political interests of the empire for Muslims to have such centers from the point of view of appropriate policies.

This continued until the end of the rule of the Russian Empire. In 1922, during the NEP, due to a certain change in attitudes towards religion and the great need for such organizations, the Mahkamayi-Sharia was officially established as a court of Muslim jurists. This court will unite a group of judges dealing with judicial, sharia, and legal issues into one organization. Later, according to the authors of the document, the organization began to struggle with each other, in which the influence of "progressive" religious scholars increased. Soon, this organization will be called the Regional Religious Departments in the regions. In the first half of the 1920s, the Nazorati-Diniya religious department was established to manage religious affairs. By 1927 in Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand, Andijan, Namangan, Margilan, Bukhara, Khiva, Kyrgyzstan there were regional administrations of the same name.

Unfortunately, there is no single Muslim religious administration in the republic, and the above-mentioned regional administrations in many places have often acted far from each other. The document states that a group of so-called "conservative" clerics tried to make religious administrations as independent as possible from Soviet rule. Attitudes towards the activities of religious administrations also varied among clerics and priests. In this regard, the document contains the views of the leader of the "conservative" part of the Kokand clergy Turakhon Makhsum. Undoubtedly, Turakhon Mahsum stressed the need for religious organizations, saying that "this organization should be a mediator between the government and the clergy, because the clergy understand the interests of the population, its way of life and customs better than the government". The Soviet government should consult the religious administration for advice before holding any event. The religious department explains the essence of the event to the population. "If the population is dissatisfied with the authorities,

they will ask the religious administration to cancel the event in the interests of the population".

It should be noted that the religious administrations operating during this period were, of course, in many cases sympathetic to the Soviet government and in a position to compromise its policies.

Therefore, Torakhon Makhsum also criticized the religious authorities, saying that "this is a very necessary organization, but the fact is that it employs people who know neither the Sharia, nor the minority of the population, nor can talk to him or the authorities." The issue is being analyzed by the Soviet security service, which notes that the religious authorities are pursuing a compromise tactic. In most respects, the clergy acted in harmony with the Soviet government, thanked the Soviet government for religious freedom, supported the "struggle of the oppressed peoples of the East against imperialism," supported national liberation movements, and so on. their performance is evaluated. For example, the document states that the Fergana religious administration would join the Osh administration "only with the consent of the authorities," and in 1926 the Tashkent religious administration could send a delegate to a conference in Mecca "only with the consent of the authorities." In doing so, they wanted to show the Soviet government and the state that they were in favor of it and that they would often approve and implement its policies, the document said. However, the document states that, in fact, in any case, these religious administrations "tried to strengthen and support religion" until the situation arose.

Certain examples are also given in this regard. For example, in the Asaka and Shahrikhan districts of Andijan district, the Fergana Religious Board pursues a policy of strengthening the position of clergy and believers in general. In this area, the clergy protested against the strict registration of waqf lands, and in the 1926-1927 academic year, about 130 religious schools were opened through their efforts. Analyzing the substance of the matter by the Soviet security service, it is finally enumerated that the religious authorities were determined to act for four purposes:

1. Expanding the network of religious education;
2. Turning "public opinion" in their own interests;
3. Establishment of the Republican Religious Board;
4. Establish your own publishing house.

Summing up the activities of the religious administrations, it was noted that the "compromise" position of this body was based on a benevolent approach to the Soviet state, in fact in the spirit of anti-Soviet government, ready to strike at the weak points of Soviet power. In this

way, the Soviet government notes that such religious administrations are contrary to its political path, when in fact these organizations are hostile to the Soviet state. Given that this record applies to 1927, it is clear that such organizations are doomed in any case to be completely abolished in the future. This reaffirms that prejudice and freedom of religion during the NEP era was a "temporary tactical retreat." As a logical continuation of this policy can be seen in the materials of the VI Plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party in June 1927. In particular, the plenum will directly address the issue of Muslim clerics and religious (old-fashioned) schools. The plenum analyzed the state of Islam in the republic, assessed the role of the clergy in the sphere of religious life, raised the issue of closing religious schools, and so on. Thus, it would be clear that the party had embarked on a path of intense struggle and fighting in the field of religious policy.

The question of whether the religious administration has an impact on party members is answered in the document. Undoubtedly, the priests also had an influence on the party members. For example, party members go to mosques on religious holidays and ceremonies, and religious traditions are also observed in everyday life. It is also noted that the marital reform, the campaigns for the liberation of women were influenced by both local communists and the clergy. Clearly, centuries-old traditions, lifestyles, and education did not exclude communists either. This, in turn, alarmed the Soviet authorities.

It is known that the Central Muslim Religious Board of Russia (TsDUM) will act as a center for the Muslim population in inner Russia, with its headquarters in Ufa. This department was the direct successor of the Sunni Muftiate of Orenburg, founded in 1788. In 1917, this department was renamed the Central Religious Board of Muslims of Inner Russia, Siberia and Kazakhstan. By 1927, the board had united 14,825 Muslim institutions.

This organization had unique work experience, skills and abilities. The department also published a publication called "Islam", copies of which were distributed in Uzbekistan and other parts of Central Asia. Undoubtedly, this administration had a certain influence on Central Asia, as well as practical relations. For example, at the World Congress of Muslims in Mecca in 1926, the Uzbek delegation included a delegation from the TsDUM. Four delegates from Uzbekistan took part in the congress of Muslim clergy in Ufa in November of the same year.

On their way back from the Mecca conference, the members of the delegation met with the well-known Bashkir orientalist, public and political figure Ahmad Zaki Walidi Dam

(1890-1970). Undoubtedly, the conversation also touched upon the life of Muslims in the Soviet country, the attitude of the Soviets to Islam, religious restrictions, oppression and others. Of course, this situation reached the ears of the Soviet political security agencies. Undoubtedly, this fact was reflected in the essence of the document.

Speaking at the Congress of Muslim Priests in Ufa in November 1926, the chairman of the TsDUM R. Fakhritdinov (1859-1936) put forward a proposal to establish a central Muslim religious administration in Central Asia itself. The Uzbek delegation returning from Ufa also supports this proposal in their homeland. For example, the Samarkand city clergy raised the issue of establishing a religious board of Muslims in Uzbekistan, and the Tashkent board decided to convene a congress to establish a religious board of Uzbekistan as a whole. From the above considerations, it is clear that in 1926-1927, efforts were made to establish a single Muslim religious administration in the republic. In this case, the republic was directly in the hands of the TsDUM in Russia, which in turn did not leave the Soviet government without concern. Naturally, the creation of a single religious administration was incompatible with the strategic political goals of the Soviet state and the Bolshevik Party in Central Asia, and it was the responsibility of the relevant authorities to obstruct it in any way. The above issue is also reflected in this document under analysis.

Although the majority of the population of Uzbekistan is Sunni Hanafi, there were also Shia Muslims in Bukhara and Samarkand districts of the republic. The document states that at that time (ie, 1926-1927) an influential person named Sheikh Mir Ali with the title of "mujtahid" stood at the head of the Shiite clergy in Bukhara. It states that the mujtahid had large waqf properties under his control, and that his prestige among the Shia Muslims was higher than that of the Soviet and party offices. The seizure of the foundation's property, in turn, has led to certain divisions and sectarianism among Shia clerics.

The analysis of the submitted document also mentions currents such as the Baha'is, Ismailis, and Ahmadis. The Baha'is operated mainly in Turkmenistan and the Ismailis in Tajikistan. The Ahmadis carried out their propaganda in India and later tried to spread their spheres of influence in Afghanistan, but failed. A representative of the Ahmadiyya sect, who tried to spread his influence in Bukhara, also faced strong opposition and failed. The document says that these currents came from abroad and contradicted the interests of the Soviet state, so it was necessary to combat them. If we look at history, it becomes clear that such separatist religious ideas were not allowed

to flourish in Central Asia, especially in Movarounnahr. Indeed, the believing people of Movarounnahr have always been firmly opposed to the establishment of currents in this land that are contrary to the essence of Islam.

At the end of the document is an 8-point conclusion on the issue. This summary describes what has changed in religious life since 1927. These were the seizure of the economic base from the hands of high-ranking priests, some of whom had moved to the countryside, and some to the Soviet intelligentsia; the influence of high-ranking clergy, especially the weakening of their position on the appointment of imams; That the so-called "conciliatory" priests (i.e., pro-Soviet) were generally few among the priests, and that their influence extended to parts of the old town and partly to the villages; The so-called "compromise" group of clergymen must admit that they were sympathetic to the Soviet government, but that this superficial view was, in fact, also against the Soviet government and the party, and that it was ready to unite with the Conservatives; With the exception of the Fergana Valley, religious administrations are not very influential among the population, and the TsDUM influences the activities of these administrations with its experience and skills; that the property of the foundation was often left out of sight of the Soviet government; the clergy, that the clergy have recently been influencing the education system; although the land and water reform has dealt a certain blow to the activities of the Eshans, but in areas where this reform has not taken place, the influence of the Eshans is still strong, and so on. Along with the above conclusions, the "practical tasks for the near future" and the list of tasks to be performed by the party are defined in the following order:

1. The Communist Party must wage a fierce struggle against the clergy, both in the city and in the countryside, against their influence, and completely free the "communist" part of Soviet society from such influence.
2. Strict boundaries between state powers and the promotion of religious beliefs. To prevent neighborhood commissions from becoming a weapon in the hands of the clergy on the ground, among the population, to spread their sphere of influence.
3. To pay special attention to the clergy of mosques directly connected with the public, to place them in the category of high priests, as they have distanced themselves from the religious sphere, and to find work for them in trade and similar organizations.
4. Strictly refrain from any level of support for "conciliatory" priests, taking advantage of the confrontation between the clergy.

5. Completion of the registration of cultural foundations, registration and withdrawal of the foundations of mosques, where it is possible to establish an economic base of priests.
6. Strictly prevent the establishment of a single center for Muslims of the Republic. Under no circumstances should the possible influence of religious administrations on the village be tolerated. Not to allow the appointment of accountants either.
7. Not to allow the publication of religious publications.
8. Complete rejection of the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Education to reorganize the activities of religious schools, to prevent the teaching of general education subjects in religious schools.
9. Support the mutual confrontation between the Eshans, avoiding their various spheres of activity.
10. All currents in Islam (Ahmadiyya, Baha'i, Ismaili), to treat them as foreign groups, as others entered the Soviet state from hostile territories. However, to treat them according to their level of influence, the scope of influence on the population.

In general, it is concluded that all measures in the case of priests should be carried out systematically, without the use of administrative measures, and not in the nature of "strikes".

In fact, a year later, the attitude towards the clergy became a "coup" campaign.

It should be noted that the document itself, first of all, marked the official attitude of the state security agencies, which are the direct support of the Bolshevik Party, to the religious situation in Central Asia, the situation of the clergy, and processes in this area. Although the document is devoted to the whole of Central Asia, its author points out that the main focus is on Uzbekistan, where Islamic traditions are deeply rooted. Because the situation in Uzbekistan had a direct impact on the spiritual life of Central Asia. The document was sent to the Central Asian Bureau (Sredazbyuro), the country's highest body of the Communist Party, on the eve of a "turning point" in Soviet policy. Undoubtedly, on the eve of the anti-religion campaign, its first elements could be seen in this document. In particular, this was clearly stated in the conclusion of the document.

By 1927, a certain freedom in the sphere of spiritual and enlightenment life, which had begun in many respects during the NEP, was coming to an end with the Communist Party's peculiar tactical "concessions" to the Muslim population. This could be seen in the beginnings of the withdrawal of foundations, attempts to close religious schools, a blow to the interests of the clergy, the emancipation of women (this was often done through administrative violence), and

so on. The clergy, who had a great influence among the population for centuries, deprived the clergy of an economic base to break their influence in social life, to force a "cultural revolution", in particular the development of the Soviet school system and its opposition to traditional religious schools, religious education, higher Muslim madrassas. restrictions on activities, the closure of prestigious, large madrassas, the confrontation of various groups of priests, and other similar measures were taken. The essence of the document, as well as its conclusion, shows that the party's agenda calls for a complete struggle against the "clergy of communist ideas" from the influence of the clergy. However, the struggle began less than a year later during a sharp campaign. The mahalla, which was traditionally a self-governing body, naturally had a high reputation of local clergy. For this reason, the mahalla commissions are tasked with preventing the growing influence of the clergy among the general population. On the other hand, the focus is on the clergy in the mosques, who have direct contact with the population in the neighborhoods, in order to "turn them more to the side of power," while on the other hand, they try to pit mosque imams and those around them against clerics. By this time, many high-ranking clerics, clerics, had become economically helpless as a result of the closure of madrassas, the downsizing and confiscation of waqf property, and often hoped for imamship in mosques. Strong blows to a group of priests at this level, breaking the sphere of influence of these clerics, lowering their prestige among the population in various ways - these and similar actions became an important priority of the relevant Soviet agencies, party policy in general. Indeed, the scholars could combine higher religious knowledge and knowledge in themselves and, with their potential, change their levels of guidance, leadership, and thinking not only among the masses but also within all sections of the Muslim population. It was no coincidence that the Soviet government, the Bolshevik Party, was well aware of this and aimed its primary blow at them. The so-called "progressive" and "conciliatory" clerics and priests, who for various objective and subjective reasons were sympathetic to the Soviet government and began to work in Soviet institutions, were also involved. The document also mentions this issue. Indeed, these religious scholars have been assessed as "dangerous elements" regardless of their position. It was no coincidence that the Soviet state, as an important part of the struggle against religion, first attacked the clerics. It was even noted that the so-called "compromise" priests and clerics who used the Soviet state were not spared the appropriate blow.

In the above-mentioned years, the Soviet government aimed to reduce the prestige of the clergy among the population, to weaken their position and strengthen the role of the Soviet ideological bodies, as well as to pit the clergy against each other, to strengthen discord and sectarianism among them.

Particular attention is paid to the confiscation of property, which is the economic base of waqfs, ie priests. Depriving them of this base was often seen as a major blow to the influence of religious figures.

The Soviet government, which believed that the establishment of a single Muslim religious administration in the country was dangerous to the country's political interests, opposed the establishment of such a single administration in Central Asia as well as in Uzbekistan. Even during the NEP era, when certain freedoms for religion were in place, the establishment of such an organization was never allowed, even under lofty political slogans. The Soviet government did not allow this either because the Bolshevik Party, the only religious authority of the Muslims, promoted alternative ideas for the Soviet regime, fearing that it would have a huge impact on the population.

Religious administrations in certain areas, such as the Control of Religion, have become government-controlled, often benevolent to the authorities. The Soviets tried to create confrontation and conflict between the clergy, the clergy, and the clergy in general, following the old-fashioned "divide and rule." Another noteworthy aspect of the issue was that it had been repeated before, and even the clergy, who had sided with the authorities, sided with them, and approved of Soviet policy, were given absolute distrust. This insecurity was previously in the form of a masked form, but since 1928 it has become more transparent. Also, intellectuals were not allowed to publish any religious publications that could reach the hands of the general population.

The document names a number of scholars who were popular in Uzbekistan at the time, and interprets it as one of the most important tasks to discredit them.

During the Soviet government's policy of "temporary concessions" to religion, the Muslim population was given a certain degree of freedom for the education system. In this situation, religious schools, and in part madrassas, began to function again. However, by the mid-1920s, a campaign had begun to put an end to this practice. It was stated that the strategic goal was not only to expand the network of Soviet schools, to ensure their priority, but also to put an end to the activities of religious schools and madrassas. Therefore, the document did not include in the agenda such

strong proposals as the complete rejection of the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Education on the reorganization of the religious education system, the ban on the teaching of general subjects in religious schools. The Muslim religious education system, which was seen as an obstacle to the consolidation of the Soviet system, naturally posed a threat to this government in the future. For this reason, as noted above, limiting any aspect of religious schools has become one of the urgent tasks on the agenda.

Conclusion

On the other hand, the system of religious education could play a fundamental role in preserving the identity, customs, traditions and values of the people. This, of course, contradicted the priorities and interests of Soviet domestic policy.

This 33-page report, sent to the Sredazbyuro (Central Asian Bureau) by the OGPU's representative for Central Asia on June 4, 1927, was a document for the Bolshevik Party and the security services in the near future to analyze the policy of the clergy and religion in general. It strictly defines not only the analysis, but also a series of tasks to be performed in the near future. Considered and properly analyzed, most of the tasks set out in this document are a comprehensive campaign against "atheism" carried out during the Stalinist "turning point", forcibly ousting the notion of religion and belief from the sphere of social life, first by clergy, then by clergy, then the persecution of the majority of ordinary believers, the complete violation of the rights of the clergy, the denial of a worthy place in society, and so on.

This document, which to this day has received little attention from historians, scholars and experts, plays an important role in the study and analysis of Soviet religious policy, the spiritual life of the 1920s. In this regard, a valuable effort has been made in this article to review and analyze the reality surrounding this document.

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